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The Place of Victims in the Theory of
Retribution
George P. Fletcher*
Remarkably, the theory of criminal law has developed
without paying much attention to the place of victims in
the analysis of responsibility or in the rationale for
punishment. You can read a first-rate book like Michael
Moore's recent Placing Blame' and not find a single
reference to the relevance of victims in imposing liability
and punishment. In the last several decades we have
witnessed notable strides toward attending to the rights
and interests of crime victims, but these concerns have yet
to intrude upon the discussion of the central issues of
wrongdoing, blame, and punishment.
Admittedly, victims and their sentiments have come to
play a major role in sentencing in the United States.
Victims are encouraged to speak at the time of sentencing
and to express their personal preferences about what
should happen to the convicted defendant. Since the
victims usually are interested in making the defendant
suffer as much as possible, this practice services the
But the sentiments of the
interests of prosecutors.
particular victims seem to me less important than the class
of victims violated by the particular offense. In the crime of
homicide, for example, it should not matter whether the
decedent is a solitary old lady killed for her money or the
mother of three killed in a drive-by-shooting. After Susan
Smith killed her two children in South Carolina, her
mother and ex-husband weighed in with their views on
whether she deserved the death penalty or not. It would
seem odd that the determination of the death penalty
should depend on the general affection or hostility of the
defendant's relatives.
Victims definitely have a place in the definition of the
* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law.
1. Michael S. Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law
(1997).
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interests protected by the criminal law. The crime of
homicide protects life-not the life of particular persons but
the right to life in the abstract. The crime of heterosexual
rape protects sexual integrity-again not sensibilities of
the particular victim but the interests of women as a class
of potential victims. The abstract nature of these protected
interests accounts for the minimal relevance of the views of
the particular victims about sentencing a convicted
offender.
The interesting challenge is to integrate victims into
the justification for punishment. Of course, one could do
that simply by asserting that the purpose of punishment is
to gratify the desires of victims to witness the suffering of
those who committed crimes against them. This approach
would reduce punishment to simple vengeance and would
hardly be very appealing, expect perhaps as a surrender to
popular emotions.
Another false start would be to
transform the question of victims' rights into the right not
to become a victim, which would provide a convenient
bridge to various theories of deterrence and social
protection. I will avoid that temptation and restrict myself
instead to the problem of finding the link between
punishment and the interests of people who have already
been victimized.
The place to focus, therefore, is the theory of
retributive punishment. And by the use of the easily
misunderstood term "retributive," I simply mean imposing
punishment because it is deserved on the basis of having
committed a crime. Punishment can either be deserved on
retributive grounds or it can be useful as an instrument of
social protection. It might in many cases be both deserved
and useful, but retributivism is a jealous theory in the
sense that whatever the beneficial side-effects of
punishment, if it is not deserved it cannot possibly be
justified. In the efforts to justify retributive punishment,
there are at least two distinct lines of thought-one that I
would call intuitive and the other theoretical in some
systematic sense. The intuitive argument begins with the
assumption that we know evil when we see it-this is
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obvious today in the field of genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity-and the right response to evil is
to simply make the offenders suffer as they have the made
the victims suffer. This is the way most people think of the
newly established international criminal court. Its purpose
is to ensure that evil is appropriately sanctioned. A basic
intuition of justice supports the urge to punish those
responsible for the barbarism associated with names like
Eichmann, Pol Pot, and Pinochet.
When intuitive retributivists are challenged they often
retreat into a vague consequentialism, arguing, for
example, that punishing dictators for homicide and torture
will deter national leaders from committing similar crimes
in the future.
It is hard to know whether this predictive claim has
merit or not. It is based on such dubious counter-factual
assumptions as the claim: If we had not punished the Nazi
leaders at Nuremberg, we would have had even more cases
of state terrorism than we have regrettably witnessed over
the last half century. Unfortunately, one has to write the
hopes of deterrence as both wishful thinking and a feeble
rationalization for the intuition that justice itself requires a
punitive response to evil deeds.
Yet the intuitive argument that we must sanction evil
deeds with punishment hardly seems like an argument at
all. Why should we credit this intuition more than other
feelings of rectitude that most intellectuals now rejectintuitions such as those favoring the death penalty or the
punishment of homosexuality and adultery. To find a
stronger foundation for retributive theory, the claim has to
go beyond the supposed validating power of intuitions. One
way of negotiating a "systematic" theory is to embed our
intuitions in a theory prescribing the fair distribution of
burdens and benefits in society. Punishment then comes
into focus as the effort to correct the criminal's seizure of
undeserved benefits. This is the line taken by Herbert
2
Morris in his famous article, Persons and Punishment.
2. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in On Guilt and Innocence:
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Another foundation for retributive thinking draws on
the Hegelian theory that the purpose of punishment is to
defeat the Wrong, as represented by the Crime.
Punishment vindicates the legal order, or the norm
prohibiting the conduct, or has some other intangible effect
that somehow recreates the moral balance upset by the
commission of the crime. Some German theorists have
adopted this Hegelian view under the clever rubric
"positive general deterrence." Negative general deterrence
is vulgar Benthamism; it relies on the intimidation and the
manipulation of potential criminals.
Positive general
deterrence is arguably a more decent and respectable use of
the criminal sanction, for it represents an effort to secure
social protection by supporting the basic norms prohibiting
criminal behavior rather than by frightening people into
compliance.
Positive general deterrence is simply
retribution by another name.
The importance of
vindicating the norm or demonstrating that Right triumphs
over Wrong is simply a more systematic way of stating the
imperative to punish in the name of justice.
Both of these approaches toward retribution-the
intuitive theory and the more sophisticated "systematic"
theories-ignore the relevance of victims. This is evident
in Michael Moore's latest book; in the course of hundreds of
pages analyzing various aspects of retributive impulses he
never once mentions the sentiments of victims whose
suffering defines the core of the crime. Moore offers no
argument for ignoring victims in his retributive theory. His
position supposedly follows as a matter of course from
rooting retributivism in the relationship between the
criminal action and the norm prohibiting it.
The idea that drives much contemporary thinking
about crime and punishment is that the core of the crime is
the action-the realm of the actor's control-and the
consequences of the action. The action violates the norm.
The consequence is a contingency that may or may not
occur. If you intentionally shoot at your victim you may or
Essays in Legal Philosophy and Moral Psychology 34 (1976).
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may not succeed in hitting him. The real crime, it is
thought, consists exclusively in the action of shooting with
the intention to kill.
One school of thought goes so far as to claim that bad
consequences are simply "bad luck" and should not provide
the basis for gauging the actor's deserved punishment.
Actually, Moore and I agree that this view is wrong and
that consequences do matter in assessing wrongdoing and
deserved punishment. In this sense Moore concedes that
harm to the victim does matter in evaluating criminal
conduct.
It should be relatively simple, then, for Moore to take
the next step and to recognize that doing justice to victims
should be part of the theory of retributive punishment. For
some reason, Moore resists this inference from the
relevance of harm in his theory of wrongdoing. I want to
convince him that his view of deserved punishment would
be richer if it included the suffering of victims in his
account of why punishment is deserved and therefore just.

I. WHO ARE THE VICTIMS?
It is important, preliminarily, to be clear about what I
mean by "victims." First, the victims that are relevant for
our purposes are the actual victims not the potential
victims of future crimes. Second, it is not the particular
victim who matters but rather the victim-type, the victims
as a class of those who have suffered a particular crime.
The purpose of bringing victims into the analysis is not to
hear their particular grievance and sentiments toward the
offender, but simply to recognize that crime is first and
foremost an action that causes harm to other people. If the
victim participates in the trial, as is common in
Continental jurisdictions, the victim should appear as the
representative of a class of victims all, of whom suffer the
same basic invasion of their interests. The victim in a
particular case is an emblem of the general class.
Unfortunately, in our most heinous crime, the only one
for which the death penalty is permissible in the United
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States, it is not so easy to identify with the victim. The
ostensible victim of homicide is, of course, the decedent.
But alas dead victims suffer not; they have no tales of woe.
The next best candidate is the family of the decedent, but
then there is some problem determining the contours of the
affected parties who are still living, and then one wonders
whether it should matter whether the putative victim's
sentiments toward the decedent are positive or negative.
Are the relatives still victims if they are happy to see the
decedent gone? Presumably not, but then it seems to look
as if the victims in homicide are simply those who are
unhappy about the killing. And then the question presents
itself whether all those unhappy about other crimesranging from rape to theft-should not qualify in much the
same way as victims of criminal aggression. But if that
approach were accepted, the notion of victimhood would
lose its conceptual contours. I am afraid there is no easy
solution to the problem of identifying the relevant victim in
homicide cases.
The important point about victimhood in the criminal
law, however, is the notion that it differs clearly from the
purely private and particular nature of victimhood in the
private law. What counts in the law of torts is the
particular person affected by the tort. This explains why
the defendant, if liable for the basic tort, also incurs
liability for all damages that directly follow from the
invasion of the particular interest. In the proverbial
textbook formula, if the victim has an "eggshell skull," the
defendant is liable for the unexpected and even
unforeseeable consequences to the particular plaintiff. In
criminal cases, the harm accrues to the public as well as to
the class of victims who suffer the invasion of a particular
interest.
This concept of public harm is not without its
difficulties. Nozick tried to explain it by invoking a notion
of general fright engendered by criminal conduct. Yet the
notion of generalized fear proves both too much and too
little. It proves too much because many torts-particularly
mass torts-also trigger widespread public anxiety and
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therefore this criterion hardly distinguishes between tort
and crime. Also it could be the case with isolated crimes
such as embezzlement and tax fraud that they engender no
public fear at all. It is not so easy, therefore, to find a
concrete manifestation of the supposed harm to the public
that serves to distinguish crimes from torts.
An alternative approach to the public nature of crime
might be simply to locate the public dimension of the crime
in the extrapolation of the concrete harm to the general
class of victims. This feature of criminal conduct is the
primary factor that renders crimes different from torts and
therefore it might be all we mean by insisting on a public
dimension to criminal behavior.
II. THE AFTER-EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT
The general assumption underlying criminal conduct
is that it begins and ends with an act causing harm.
Admittedly, this is an important assumption of a liberal
approach to criminal liability. Stressing the act causing
harm provides a shield against imposing liability based on
the status or the dangerousness of the suspect. The
assumption underlying this approach to liability is that to
protect the freedom and the privacy of the suspect, we
should not inquire about the actor's personality and history
in establishing liability.
Yet there is another way of thinking about crime that
does not, so far as I can tell, entail an invasion of the
suspect's freedom of privacy. A criminal act establishes a
particular relationship with the victim. The criminal gains
a form of dominance that continues after the crime has
supposedly occurred. This feature of criminal aggression,
the principle of dominance, provides the clue, I argued
some time ago, to understanding the puzzling crime of
blackmail. The difference between acceptable exchanges
and blackmail consists primarily in the leverage the
3. See George P. Fletcher, Blackmail: The Paradigmatic Crime, 141 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1617 (1993).
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blackmailer gains over his prey: As soon as the prey agrees
once to paying hush money, the blackmailer can demand
more in the future. Other crimes of violence bear a
resemblance to blackmail. In the aftermath of rape,
victims often fear a return of the rapist; victims of burglary
have reason to feel insecure in their homes. Implicit in the
threat of recurrence is the offender's unjustified dominance
over the victim.
The function of arrest, trial, and
punishment is to overcome this dominance and reestablish
the equality of victim and offender.
This victim-based argument does not differ, in
principle, from the Hegelian argument that punishment
serves to vindicate the norms against those who have
sought to defeat it. The only difference is that the "victim"
takes the place of the "norm" in the structure of the
argument. In the traditional Hegelian view, the norm is
defended and the aggressor symbolically defeated; in my
version of the argument, the position and dignity of the
victim are rendered equal relative to the aggressor.
Seeking to bring about equality between victim and
offender is a classic concern in Aristotle's theory of justice.
Corrective justice seeks the equality that existed between
victim and offender prior to the wrongful act; liability is
supposed to reinstate arithmetic equality by taking the
gains of the action from the wrongdoing and transferring
them to the victim. Distributive justice seeks the geometric
equality of distributing the goods and evils of society
proportionately among potential recipients. Retributive
justice combines features of both corrective and distributive
justice. The corrective dimension consists in seeking
equality between offender and victim by subjecting the
offender to punishment and communicating to the victim a
concern for his or her antecedent suffering.
The distributive dimension of punishments consists in
the legal imperative to punish all offenders equally. The
evil of punishment should be distributed fairly, with each
offender receiving his just deserts. Admittedly, this
principle of equal distribution gives way in many
jurisdictions to prosecutorial discretion and plea-
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But this only demonstrates that these
bargaining.
institutions, taken for granted in the United States, stand
tension with basic principles of equal
in considerable
4
justice.
In view of the fact that all theories of justice are
primarily concerned with equality, it makes sense to
ground retributive justice as well in a commitment to bring
about equality both between offender and victim and
This approach to retribution runs
among offenders.
through our classical philosophical text on retributive
justice, namely Immanuel Kant's treatment in his
Rechtslehre or Philosophy of Law.5
Of course, there are problems with this theory of
punishment as there are with any theory. Not all crimes
express dominance over victims. Embezzlement might,
because once the embezzler has succeeded, the propertyholder, once victimized by an insider to his organization,
remains ever at risk. But perjury and other offenses
against the administration of justice hardly seem to entail
victims-except those who might have suffered unjust
conviction as a result of perjured testimony. Yet those who
sought to impeach President Clinton did speak about
getting away with perjury as putting oneself above the law
and therefore posing a great risk to the society. Whether
one perceives this risk depends, in large part, on whether
one sees Clinton's alleged perjury as cabined by the
framework of sexual behavior and a private law suit or
whether one sees it as an offense against the
administration of justice comparable to lying in a way that
might result in the conviction of an innocent person.

4. In United States v. Singleton, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
initially held that offering potential defendants special "deals" in return for their
testimony against other defendants violated principles of equality between the
prosecution and the defense. See 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 165 F.3d
1297, 1298 (10th Cir. 1999) (en bane) (holding that the federal bribery statute, 18
U.S.C. § 201(c)(2), "does not apply to the United States or an Assistant United
States Attorney functioning within the official scope of the office").
5. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (Mary Gregor trans., 1991).
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III. IMPUNIDAD
The particular evil represented by someone's "placing
oneself above the law" raises the problem whether there is
a duty to punish simply to avoid the phenomenon of
impunidad-remainingunpunished for one's crimes. Kant
dealt with this problem in his famous example of an island
society about to disband. As he writes:
Even if a civil society were to be dissolved by the consent of
all of its members (e.g., if a people inhabiting an island
decided to separate and disperse throughout the world), the
last murderer remaining in prison would first have to be
executed, so that each has done to him what his deeds
deserve [What his acts are worth, it says in German] and
blood guilt does not cling to the people who are not having
insisted upon this punishment; for otherwise the people can
be regarded as collaborators in the public violation of
justice.6
Blood guilt in the biblical sense meant that there was
some ongoing disorder in the moral universe. As David
Daube has explained the role of blood in punishment for
homicide, the manslayer acquires control over the victim's
blood-the life spirit. Executing him releases the life spirit
7
and enables it to return to God, the source of all life.
"Blood guilt" serves as a good metaphor for the evil of
impunidad-the phenomenon of offenders getting away
with their crimes. The avoidance of impunidad has become
a most compelling motive for criminal prosecution in recent
years.
The newly enacted Charter for a Permanent
International Criminal Court cites this concern in its
preamble:
Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole must not go
unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be
ensured by taking measures at the national level and by
6. Id. at 142.
7. David Daube, Studies in Biblical Law 122-23 (1947).
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enhancing international cooperation, determined to put an
end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and
thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes... 8

Note that the first clause states an absolute duty to
prosecute "crimes of concern to the international
community," while the second clause falls back on the
argument of "prevention."
The frequent use of the Spanish term impunidad
reveals the origins of this principle in the failure of Latin
American governments to prosecute military authorities in
Argentina and Chile who were responsible for the
kidnapping and killing of the desaparecidos.9 The same
sentiment has gripped the West Germans who see the
prosecution of East Germans responsible for such crimes as
killing those who tried to escape to the West as necessary
component of their "coming to grips with the past"
(Bewd1tigung der Vergangenheit). The basic sentiment is
that allowing crimes to go unpunished somehow repeats
the evil. It is as though the government and the entire
society becomes complicit in the occurrence of the crime.
This, I believe, is what Kant was trying to get at with
his thought-experiment of the island society about to
dissolve. If the people, through their government, do not
insist upon punishment, they "can be regarded as
collaborators in the public violation of justice."10 Kant's
intuition represents a fundamental plank in the tradition
of retributive justice. The reason we must punish is to
avoid liability for impunidad-for allowing criminals to go
punished.
The intuition remains remarkably strong in modern
society. It accounts for the depth of public reaction in cases
in which the state has failed to punish or failed to punish
adequately. Just witness the outrage at acquittals that are
8. Preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998.
9. For a valuable study of these prosecutions, see Jaime Malamud-Goti,
Game Without End: State Terror and the Politics of Justice (1996).
10. Kant, supra note 5, at 142.
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perceived to be unjust-acquittals such as those in the
cases of O.J. Simpson, the police officers who beat up
Rodney King, the trial of Lemrick Nelson for having killed
Yankel Rosenbaum, and all the Southern acquittals in the
trials growing out of the civil rights movement. Where
there is a strong segment of the public which identifies
strongly with the victim, this reaction is likely to be more
acute. When the victim is a member of a minority group,
the entire group is likely to interpret the impunidad as a
betrayal of the commitment to equal citizenship."
Admittedly, Kant's theory of complicity in the wrong of
non-prosecution has some flaws. The rationale for avoiding
impunidad is not exactly the same as justifying the use of
retributive punishment ab initio. The argument that
unjust non-prosecution entails complicity in the original
crime presupposes the regular use of the criminal sanction
as a background condition, as the "baseline" against which
deviations are measured. If we could imagine a world in
which there was no punishment, no practice for responding
to criminal aggression, the problem of justifying retributive
punishment would be cast in different terms.
The argument of complicity entailed by impunidad is
embedded in a historical situation. The assumption is that
for one reason or another the practice of punishing
criminals has developed and has become a standard feature
of social expectations. But this is the way arguments for
equal treatment ordinary proceed.
A practice is
established, some people are left out, and then the claim is
made that those who receive less are being unfairly
discriminated against. This is the kind of argument made
in favor of complicity in the failure to punish "the last
murderer remaining in prison."
We should recall that we have offered two arguments
for introducing the victim in the framework of retributive
theory. Both of these arguments are based, directly or
indirectly, on the significance of equal treatment in the
11. These issues are explored at greater length in George P. Fletcher, With
Justice for Some: Victims' Rights in Criminal Trials (1995).
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theory of justice. The first argument is that acts of
criminal violence establish a form of domination over the
victim. The function of punishment is to counteract this
domination and reestablish equality between the victim
and the offender. This argument does not presuppose a
history of punishing crime, and therefore it can serve as a
rationale for punishment ab initio. Once the practice of
punishment becomes the historical background for thinking
about criminal responsibility, the decision not to
punishment represents a serious departure from the
established norm of equal treatment. Thus the argument
emerges that deliberately not-punishing criminals who
deserve punishment becomes a means of acquiring indirect
responsibility for the crime.
In view of the role of equality in these victim-based
arguments and in view of the centrality of equality in
theories of just punishment, it seems obvious that we
should consider these proposals as proof that the interests
of victims may be properly integrated into the theory of
retributive punishment. Michael Moore may disagree, but
the burden is on him to refute this compelling case.

